The Battle For The Soul Of British Conservatism
The ongoing Conservative leadership election is not just a party's struggle for self-preservation, but a debate for what Conservatism is and should be - a question no one can yet answer.
Three months ago, Britain’s Conservative Party suffered the worst election defeat in its modern history, hemorrhaging over half of their voters and plummeting to 121 seats, a net loss of 251. It marked a sudden departure from the auspicious picture five years prior, when Boris Johnson lead the party to a commanding majority and his dominance over the country’s politics seemed so assured that some commentators referred to the 2020s as the ‘Johnson Decade.’
Suffice to say, those predictions turned out premature. While many expected the party to lose support - after all, no political party in UK history has won five consecutive elections - the scale of its collapse was unprecedented. During the election campaign, the party frequently dipped below 20%, polling, at times, as low as 16%. Conventional wisdom often dictated that there was a base level of support for the natural party of governing underneath which it could not sink. But now it is entering subterranean zones whose existence was until now merely theoretical.
Unsurprisingly, this electoral annihilation coincided with the total intellectual collapse of Britain’s Conservative Party as a vessel for Right-wing politics. Despite governing the country for fourteen uninterrupted years - five of those years with a majority that gave them almost dictatorial powers, thanks to the inherent quirks of the British parliamentary system - the party chose not to remould the country and institutions in their image as their leftist opponents surely would, but to manage the social, cultural and economic decline precipitated by Tony Blair, tinkering around the edges but largely keeping the Blairite-neoliberal structure intact.
That’s why Michael Gove, one of the party’s recognised intellectual and most competent administrators, redefined political extremism, declaring it as “the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance”. It is not difficult to foresee how the technocratic liberal managerialism of the coming Starmer administration will interpret its vague definition of “intolerance.” Like the 2011 Prevent definition, its 2024 replacement is a knee-jerk reaction to a perceived Islamist threat that, through moral cowardice at defining its opponent clearly, will instead disproportionately fall upon the political Right. That the liberal Left’s initial reactions to Gove’s tinkering centred on whether the party’s donors could be defined as extremists, or whether Gove’s chosen reading material defined him as one himself, highlights the inevitable direction of travel.
In an attempt to make short-lived political capital at the disquiet over recent pro-Palestine protests, Gove created a powerful weapon against the British Right. Just as Blair’s Human Rights Act enshrined progressivism into the state’s essence, the new definition of extremism will shrink conservatism’s space for querying or opposing the most sweeping progressive innovations. Along with the Online Safety Act, it is a hurried piece of legislation which effectively functions as a muzzle on “harmful” Right-wing discourse. None of the alleged “culture war” dividing lines on which the Conservatives have rhetorically sought to distinguish themselves from Labour — on mass immigration, the ECHR, gender politics or progressive activist judges and civil servants — will survive the expansive interpretations of “the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” that will surely follow.
When The Times columnist Phillip Collins witnessed the 2001 Labour election campaign, he became increasingly perplexed by the campaign team’s level of anxiety, even though a Labour victory was a foregone conclusion. It was later explained to Collins that the whole object of the 2001 campaign was not just to re-elect a Labour government, but to provoke the destruction of the “forces of conservatism.” The Blairites knew Labour would eventually lose an election, so wanted to inflict a defeat so traumatising on the Conservative party that they would jettison every conservative policy and belief they held in a bid to assimilate into the society Blair was creating. When they eventually took power in the future, the theory went, they would do so not as a conservative party intent on reversing the revolution but as a Blairite party determined to preserve and advance it. That is what we have seen these past 14 years.
Greek philosopher Panagiotis Kondylis once wrote that Conservatism was already dead: for “outside this social and intellectual historical framework, conservatism can only be referred to as the epitaph of a process that has already run its course”. With the 19th-century victory of bourgeois liberalism — and its replacement, in turn, by “mass democracy,” of which both fascism and Soviet Communism were extremist sub-categories — conservatism, in his view, was left a meaningless husk, a rhetorical flourish to distinguish one form of liberalism from its electoral rivals through the mere narcissism of small differences.
Yet, had he survived to observe the last flailing days of Europe’s oldest political party, still squatting in office to no discernible purpose, even he would surely have been shocked at the vacuousness and self-defeating liberalism of the faction which in Britain bears conservatism’s name.
Now, unburdened by government, energized by a lively leadership contest and gleeful at the tumultuous debut of Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Labour government, the Conservatives gather in Birmingham, not just to appoint a new leader following Rishi Sunak’s resignation, but to mull over what Conservatism as a political ideology and civic duty truly represents. It’s a question that, at times, has defied even the most ardent dogmatic party member.
During their time in office, the Conservatives lurched from one crisis to another, spending more time extinguishing the flames of a personal scandal than delivering for the British people or fulfilling the mandate that catapulted them to power in the first place. Immigration, crime and taxes went up, not down, and the economy became mirred in chronic cycles of stagnant growth, as foreign investment and infrastructure spending fell off a cliff. The legacy of their latest attempt at governing will not be treated kindly by historical scholars. In fact, it was a bastardization of their political creed - to offer stable governance while preserving the fundamental structures of the British state.
At their conference, the four remaining candidates — Kemi Badenoch, James Cleverly, Robert Jenrick and Tom Tugendhat — ran a beauty-contest-style gauntlet, giving interviews, grinning for selfies, lobbying lawmakers and even hawking branded merchandise from their own booths. Each candidate submitted to questioning by a journalist from the right-wing news channel, GB News, which gave a glimpse into the kinds of issues that motivate Tory Party members, if not the country at large. They all pledged to reduce immigration, and three of them even said they would consider pulling out of the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty Britain signed 73 years ago, if it raised hurdles to Britain’s efforts to tighten its borders.
Tory members of Parliament will vote next week to narrow the field to two finalists, before a winner is finally coronated by party members on Nov. 2.
Whoever finds themselves leading the party will still be confronted with the same electoral arithmetic - a Conservative Party split not just ideologically, but geographically, the few seats they hold balancing precauriously on razor-thing margins and the seats they need to win back threatened on both of their right and left flank, the same position Labour found itself in after their bruising defeat in 2019.
Of course, the contenders could do what Labour did in opposition: say as little as possible and watch while the Government stumbles from one fiasco to another. Labour has not had the greatest start to its time in office, and so watching and sniping will indeed be tempting. But it should be resisted. For one thing, all the other opposition parties will be playing that game, and each has a different but highly focused audience more receptive to a fine-tuned message. Youth irritated by some new government decision will be drawn to the Greens who will have pounced on it. Scottish Labour voters angered by factory closures, will be inclined to drift back to the newly led SNP. Those Labour voters whose identity is bound up in the traditional priorities of care and compassion, already irritated by the cancelation of the winter fuel allowance, will be hoovered up by the Lib Dems positioning themselves as Labour’s conscience. Those Labour voters in Red Wall constituencies, already despondent that Keir Starmer has only noticed them in respect of their proclivity to riot, will be prime targets for Reform.
If they want to regain ground, they will need to rehabilitate their image. Yet, none of the contenders appeared to offer a convincing answer to the questions confronting the Tories. How can they win back votes they lost on their right flank to Nigel Farage, leader of the anti-immigration party, Reform U.K., which lies second in nearly a hundred seats, without alienating the voters who switched to the centrist Liberal Democrats, who made noticeable inroads mainly in areas traditionally dominated by the Conservatives?
Jeremy Hunt’s tax cuts did not sway them. Those who defected to the Lib Dems were mostly on decent, middle-class incomes and, perhaps, were morally disgusted by the presumption that appealing to their greed would keep them onboard. They jumped. Conversely, the promise of tax cuts merely confirmed among Red Wall voters tempted by Labour, that although the Tories had talked about restoring jobs, skills and pride to their towns, they had been duped: what the Tories cared about all along, was the rich.
More threatening for the party is the exodus of young voters. New polling from Savanta reveals that young Conservatives who deserted the party in July — succumbing to the clutches of Reform UK, Labour, the Liberal Democrats or apathy — are unlikely to return to the fold in 2029. Of those aged under 45 who switched away from the Tories between 2019 and 2024 or who didn’t vote Conservative in either election but would consider doing so in future, 56% have claimed they will not be opting for the party next time. One in five former young Conservatives have ruled out voting for the party ever again. If those figures weren’t bleak enough, the average age at which voters are more likely to become a Conservative is 63.
Demographics is swinging against them. While the youth have always historically voted for the Left, this disparity is unprecedented and poses genuine questions for the long-term viability of not just the Conservative Party but Conservatism as a political ideology in the UK if such trends continue. Even Shadow Chancellor Jeremy Hunt, an MP for almost 20 years, claimed this week that his party’s “biggest strategic challenge” is the age of its median voter. He argued that finding support among young Britons is a “litmus test” for the overall health of the Tory mission.
A disorganised social media strategy might partially explain why the party failed to cut through with young voters, considering how many of them are trapped in the social media ecosystem, but the solutions run far deeper and more systematic than lacking a presence on TikTok. Fundamentally, the party betrayed its morals, its voters and its whole reason for existence. And, to make matters worse, it could not provide a stable government.
Robert Jenrick, the current favourite according to the betting orders, focused on lowering immigration, an issue which has become increasingly central to Right-of-centre youth politics across Europe. According to YouGov polling from this week, 47% of Britons aged 18-24 think immigration into the country is too high. Among Conservative voters in this age bracket, the figure rises to 91%. Speaking on the conference main stage on Tuesday afternoon, he argued that rising net migration into the UK has “put immense pressure on housing”, “undercut the wages of British voters”, and “has made our country less united”. By appealing to concerns about housing shortages and low wages and connecting them to immigration, Jenrick hopes to create a new reason for young voters to consider voting for his party in the future.
It’s not a bad strategy by any means. Across the Atlantic, there are already similar attempts being made to frame regular problems through the lens of conservative ideology, to varying levels of success. In Canada, the Conservative Party is projected to win not just the biggest victory in its history but in all of Canadian political history. This recent popularity is fueled, in part, by its popularity with young voters, who fear the threat mass, uncontrolled immigration brings for employment, housing and crime following a large uptick in foreign workers, mostly from India. With the UK facing similar demographic trends, it’s not unreasonable to believe a charismatic and eloquent speaker can translate that success here, bringing the party to the voters, instead of the voters to the party.
Call me cynical, but this latest display is nothing more than a pantomime, one last physical spasm from a decaying, rotting corpse. It is hard to believe a new leader will solve the Tory existential crisis. For one thing, the roster on offer does not project much confidence. None of the remaining candidates are particularly gifted orators. Their time in government is tainted by scandals and blunders. They often struggle to articulate a clear vision for the party and what Conservatism should strive for without regurgitating the same, worn-out soundbites concocted in the back of a Westminster office and tailored to appease the media class.
We have a Con-Lab-Lib uniparty that agrees on almost everything. From Net Zero to high taxes to uncontrolled immigration to institutions dominated by the progressive intelligentsia, the parties disagree on very little these days, which might explain why the last election saw the lowest turnout in decades and why an increasing number of people are growing uninterested in their political engagement.
As of right now, Conservatism does not exist as a tangible ideology in the UK. Without this, the Conservative Party has no guiding light, no anchor to hold them steady and keep them afloat. They are adrift, forced to navigate the uncharted waters with no captain or sense of direction.
The parameters of the national debate have been set by the Blairite neoliberals. In effect, they are the new conservatives, the ones who are entrenched in all the institutions and shape each political, social and cultural discourse.
For those of us who want a country built on the principles of Conservatism doctrine - strong sense of community, a common national identity, an adherence to traditional values, etc. we can only hope that the Conservative party’s crushing electoral defeat will herald not only its ejection from power but its total dissolution: for even at the modest task which Kondylis assigns conservatism, the temporary preservation of yesterday’s liberalism, the Tories are abject failures.
Reform can perhaps off to be its spiritual successor, spearheading a new conservative revolution but Farage will not be able to reshape the party system alone and will no doubt become a liability the longer he clings to power. Having been in the national spotlight for over two decades now, he has already been defined by anyone that pays attention to politics long enough. He has a robust base of support but also a very low ceiling that he may struggle to break. He’s a good cheerleader, someone that rouses and galvanises the faithful, but does very little to convert new disciples. At some people, he will need to move on and another man or woman will need to take his place. Ideologies that rest on a single man do not fare very well.
If British Conservatism is to find it soul once again, it must be a mass movement and involve people from all walks of life - be they young or old, white or black, man or woman.